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Leveling Up After DOMA
DEBORAH A. WIDISS∗
So let’s say three soldiers are injured and they are all in same-sex
relationships, and in each instance the other partner in this relationship
wants to visit the soldier in—in a hospital.
The first is a spouse in a State that allows same-sex marriage, the
second is a domestic partner in a State that an [sic] allows that, but not
same-sex marriage, the third is in an equally committed loving
relationship in a State that doesn’t involve either. Now, your argument
is that, under Federal law, the first would be admitted—should be
admitted, but the other two would be kept out?
—Justice Samuel Alito to Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr., Transcript of
Oral Argument in Windsor v. United States1
INTRODUCTION
Windsor v. United States2 ended one form of federal marriage discrimination—
the refusal to recognize any same-sex marriages—and simultaneously created a
new form of federal marriage discrimination. Under the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), same-sex couples were simply categorically denied federal rights.3 Now
that this section of DOMA has been held unconstitutional, same-sex couples are
sorted into three tiers, with married same-sex couples who live in states that
recognize their marriages receiving the full panoply of federal marriage rights;
married same-sex couples who live in states that refuse to recognize their marriages
receiving some, but not all, federal rights; and unmarried same-sex couples
receiving none of the federal rights.4 This new discrimination is different from
DOMA and from the bans on same-sex marriage that remain in place in more than
thirty states. These older bans distinguish (I believe unfairly and
unconstitutionally)5 between same-sex and different-sex couples, but they treat

∗ Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I am grateful to the
staff of the Indiana Law Journal for organizing this symposium and inviting me to be part of
it, and for their conscientious work in finalizing this Essay for publication. Thanks also to
Susan Appleton, Jill Hasday, Courtney Joslin, Kara Loewentheil, and Doug NeJaime, as well
as to my colleagues and co-essayists Dan Conkle, Dawn Johnsen, Steve Sanders, and Ryan
Scott, for conversations about the ideas that became this Essay and for suggestions on earlier
drafts. Additionally, I thank participants in the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting
and the Big Ten UnTenured Conference for their helpful comments. I am grateful to Interim
Dean Hannah Buxbaum and the Indiana University Maurer School of Law Summer
Research Stipend Program for support of this project.
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 85, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 45, 47, and 49.
5. See Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 1375 (2010) (discussing arguments under the fundamental rights branch of
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same-sex couples consistently.6 By contrast, under the new regime, the federal
government—a single sovereign entity—is now treating committed same-sex
couples who live in states in which they cannot marry quite differently from their
married counterparts. Because of this “derivative” discrimination, a product of the
interaction of federal policy with state marriage bans, the majority of gay and
lesbian couples remain ineligible for full federal marriage rights.7 Windsor was an
important step forward, but we need to finish the process of “leveling up.”
In the initial aftermath of the Windsor decision there has been significant
discussion of one aspect of this “new” marriage discrimination: the question of
whether various federal statutory regimes will adopt a place-of-celebration rule—
recognizing any marriage that is valid in the jurisdiction where the ceremony
occurred—or a domicile rule—recognizing only those marriages that are valid in
the jurisdiction where the couple resides.8 This has largely been analyzed as a
matter of statutory and regulatory analysis, looking statute by statute at whether,
and how, “marriage” is defined, or applying general choice-of-law and conflicts
rules.9 Leading advocacy groups, major newspapers, and even President Obama
have urged adoption of a uniform place-of-celebration rule,10 and many federal
agencies have announced that they will recognize all legal marriages, even if the
couple lives in a state that does not.11
I applaud this recognition that committed same-sex couples who live in states
with marriage bans should have access to the federal rights that are premised on
marriage. But there are some serious problems with relying solely on a place-ofcelebration approach to address the current inequity. It requires that these couples
travel out-of-state (and often significant distances) to marry simply to claim federal
benefits, imposing an unfair burden on same-sex couples and one which will likely
further exacerbate class-based variation in marriage rates. It also all but guarantees
that many same-sex couples will be unable to celebrate their marriage in the
equal protection law); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime,
Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence¸ 30 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 461 (2007) (discussing sex discrimination arguments).
6. This is a slight oversimplification. There have been a few states that have
recognized out-of-state same-sex marriages even when refusing to license same-sex
marriages themselves, but generally only for a relatively short period of time before
expanding marriage rights within their own states. See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689
(discussing New York’s evolution on the issue). In October 2013, Oregon began recognizing
out-of-state marriages, but Oregon does not (yet) permit same-sex couples to marry within
the state. See Richard Gonzales, How a County Clerk Ignited the Gay Marriage Debate in
N.M., NPR (Oct. 22, 2013).
7. See infra note 44.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 47–49 (discussing guidance provided by relevant
agencies regarding specific federal policies); see also William Baude, Beyond DOMA:
Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012) (discussing how
general choice-of-law principles should apply in this context); Hillel Y. Levin, Resolving
Interstate Conflicts Over Same-Sex Non-Marriage, 63 FLA. L. REV. 47 (2011) (discussing
how conflicts principles should apply to interstate recognition of civil unions or domestic
partnerships, as well as marriage).
10. See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 47–49.
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company of their friends and family. And some couples who do go out-of-state to
marry may later discover a separate—hidden, but very significant—cost: an
inability to divorce if the marriage does not unfold as they hope. The reason?
Generally, a couple can divorce only in their home state, and many states refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages even to dissolve them.
For couples who live in states in which they cannot marry, these costs might be
preferable to the alternative of being denied federal rights entirely under a domicile
rule. But this is a false choice, because it simply accepts, as a given, that statelicensed marriages will, and implicitly should, continue to be the exclusive
mechanism for accessing core federal rights. In this Essay, I challenge that
underlying assumption. (In a separate working paper, I discuss the related question
of whether, consistent with equal protection principles, the federal government may
continue to use marriage as the sole dividing line.)12 As suggested by Justice
Alito’s question opening this Essay, it is rather odd, to say the least, that same-sex
couples’ rights and obligations under key federal statutory provisions now depend
on the state in which they happen to live.13 Rather than accept the serious problems
implicit in a place-of-celebration rule, I argue that the federal government should
develop its own mechanism—a federal domestic partner or “marriage” registry—
for identifying committed couples.14 Although this would involve some logistical
challenges, the success of state and local registries suggest that this could provide a
workable, and fundamentally fairer, vehicle for providing access to federal benefits,
rights, and obligations.
Of course, it is widely expected that sooner or later (and many think sooner), the
Supreme Court will hold that state bans on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional.
If same-sex couples were permitted to marry in all states, the problem of derivative
federal discrimination would disappear entirely. I would celebrate a decision that
led to marriage equality in all states, but it also might signal a lost opportunity.
DOMA and the Windsor litigation highlighted the extraordinary variety of
federal rights, benefits, and obligations that are currently premised on marriage.
The current uneven treatment of same-sex couples continues that conversation. If
same-sex couples are truly treated identically to different-sex couples under federal
and state law, pressure for rethinking federal marriage law more generally may
decrease. This would be unfortunate. While not my primary focus in this Essay, I
agree with other commentators that it would be preferable to replace the use of
marriage as an all-or-nothing gateway to benefits (for both different-sex and samesex couples) with more tailored policies that can better achieve specific underlying

12. Deborah A. Widiss, Federal Marriage Discrimination, Take Two (working draft) (on
file with author).
13. The factual predicate for Justice Alito’s question is actually incorrect, see infra text
accompanying note 104, but his more general point that federal rights for these three couples
would vary significantly is undeniably true. There are other areas of law where federal rights
turn on variation in state law. See, e.g., Astrue v. Caputo, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2032 & fn.9
(2012) (discussing variation in state law regarding intestacy rights for posthumously
conceived children, which in turn affects eligibility for Social Security survivor benefits).
However, marriage is probably unique in the number of distinct federal right and obligations
affected and in the number of individuals affected.
14. See infra Part II.C.
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objectives.15 Thus, my hope is that efforts to “level up” marriage policy to treat
committed same-sex couples equally regardless of their state of residence will not
undermine efforts to also “broaden out” and “focus in” marriage policy. Indeed, a
federal domestic partner registry could serve as a vehicle for such future tailoring.
Part I of this Essay suggests that although federal law generally uses marriage as
an imperfect but workable proxy for identifying committed couples with integrated
finances, variation in state marriage rights means that reliance on marriage does not
effectively serve this purpose for same-sex couples. Part II explores the relative
strengths and weaknesses of two different approaches to “leveling up”—adopting
place-of-celebration rules and creating a federal domestic partner or “marriage”
registry—and advocates the latter approach. Part III briefly discusses how this
“new” federal discrimination fits into broader discussions of changing family forms
and the need to reconsider federal marriage policy in general.
I. FEDERAL “MARRIAGE” LAW
As is now familiar, the General Accounting Office has identified more than
1000 provisions of the federal code that use marriage as a factor in determining
rights, benefits, and obligations, spanning the gamut from intellectual property to
immigration.16 A comprehensive review of federal marriage law is beyond the
scope of this Essay, but, generally, federal laws use marriage, or sometimes
marriage plus other factors, to identify “real” relationships that Congress has
determined should be protected, encouraged, or otherwise recognized, sometimes
as a means of supporting children born to such marriages.17 For a wide range of
benefits—such as family medical leave rights, federal civilian and military
employee benefits, and immigration purposes—federal law limits availability to
married couples as a way both to foster marital relationships and to protect the
government and private employers from being “duped” into providing these kinds
of privileges in the absence of (what the government recognizes as) a bona fide
significant relationship. In other contexts, ranging from joint tax returns, to
government ethics rules, to eligibility for means-tested poverty supports and
student loans, federal laws use marriage as a means of identifying individuals who
are likely to have integrated finances, such that the failure to identify individuals as
part of a collective unit could either invite abuse or fail to appropriately recognize
presumptively available resources.18 Indeed, as I have discussed elsewhere, the
structure of many aspects of federal (and state) marriage law not only responds to

15. See infra Part III.
16. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT:
UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004).
17. See generally Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2012)
(providing a detailed analysis of marriage fraud doctrines in various areas of law).
18. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (discussing
government ethics rules and student financial aid); Abrams, supra note 17, at 18–19, 28–29
(discussing means-tested programs); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS:
Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1993)
(discussing tax).
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integrated finances but also encourages couples to specialize into distinct
caregiving and breadwinning roles.19
For many couples there are important financial benefits to being recognized as
married under the federal code. These include exemptions from paying tax on the
imputed value of health insurance received through a spouse’s employment,20
eligibility for Social Security spousal benefits,21 and, as highlighted in Windsor, the
ability to inherit from a spouse without paying estate tax.22 Although Edie
Windsor’s $363,000 tax bill23 was rather unusual, large sums may be at stake for
typical middle class couples as well. For example, because of Social Security
spousal benefits, which permit a dependent spouse to receive benefits based on
contributions made by a breadwinning spouse, a married couple with a sole
breadwinner making $44,600 (the national average wage) will likely receive at least
$500,000 more in Social Security and Medicare benefits than an unmarried
individual earning that same $44,600, even though the married couple pays exactly
the same amount as the unmarried individual in total payroll taxes.24 Couples who
earn significantly different amounts also pay less in taxes if they are married than
they would pay collectively if they were single (this is usually called the “marriage
bonus”).25 And federal civilian or military employees receive generous spousal
benefits.26 Federal rights premised on marriage may be immeasurably important to
individuals for reasons other than their pocketbooks. If one’s partner is a foreign

19. Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 721,
747–57 (2012).
20. See, e.g., M.V. LEE BADGETT, WILLIAMS INST., UNEQUAL TAXES ON EQUAL
BENEFITS: THE TAXATION OF DOMESTIC PARTNER BENEFITS (2007) (estimating that an
employee with a domestic partner receiving health insurance pays on average $1069 per year
more in taxes than a comparable married employee with a spouse receiving the same
benefits).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c) (2006); see also Peter W. Martin, The Case for Reforming
the Program’s Spouse Benefits While “Saving Social Security” (Cornell Law Sch., Working
Paper No. 12-67), available at http://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/facbib/faculty.asp?facid
=21&show=online (providing detailed history of spousal benefits).
22. 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2006); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (discussing this provision).
23. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
24. See C. EUGENE STEUERLE & CALEB QUAKENBUSH, URBAN INST., SOCIAL SECURITY
AND MEDICARE TAXES AND BENEFITS OVER A LIFETIME (2012), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412660-Social-Security-and-Medicare-Taxes-and
-Benefits-Over-a-Lifetime.pdf. For more on Social Security spousal benefits, see infra text
accompanying notes 98–102.
25. See, e.g., Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (of
Money) Have to Do with Joint Tax Filing?, 11 NEV. L.J. 718, 719–20 (2011).
26. See, e.g., KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21029, SURVIVOR
BENEFITS FOR FAMILIES OF CIVILIAN FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES (2012)
(summarizing civilian spouse survivor benefits); Matthew Alex Ward, The Military Must
Lead in Advocating for Marriage Equality, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457 (2013)
(summarizing military spousal benefits); Healthcare Eligibility, OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT.,
http://www.opm.gov/healthcare-insurance/healthcare/eligibility/ (federal employees’ spouses
are eligible for health insurance).
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national, marriage provides a pathway to citizenship.27 If one’s partner is seriously
ill, marriage provides, for many employees, a right to hold onto a job while taking
time off to provide care.28
But not all couples benefit by being considered married for federal purposes.
Beyond the lowest tax brackets, married couples who earn relatively equal incomes
pay more in taxes than they would if they were single.29 Within days of the decision
in Windsor, there were numerous articles in the popular press cautioning same-sex
couples to be wary of this “marriage penalty,”30 an issue made particularly relevant
by the fact that same-sex couples have historically been more likely than differentsex couples to earn relatively similar amounts.31 Marriage (to a wage-earner) may
also raise an individual above eligibility levels for means-tested programs such as
the Earned Income Tax Credit or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.32 And
remarriage by a widow or a divorcee generally cuts off eligibility for Social
Security spousal benefits.33
My deeper point is not that a given couple will always want to be considered
married for federal purposes, but rather that federal law makes judgments about
how to fairly distribute and apportion government resources, benefits, and
obligations among various family structures, and it uses marriage as a proxy for
identifying couples who have made a long-term commitment to each other, who
may well be raising children together, and who have integrated their finances.34
Same-sex (and different-sex) couples in all states form these kinds of relationships,
and the federal government should strive to treat such couples, whatever their state
of residence, relatively equally.
There is at least one prominent past example of reform efforts spurred by
variation in state family law that resulted in similar couples being treated
significantly differently under federal law. Until the 1940s, married couples filed

27. See, e.g., Policy Manual, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES 202 (June 10,
2013), http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/PDF/PolicyManual.pdf.
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006).
29. See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 25, at 719–20.
30. See, e.g., Blake Ellis, Same-Sex Couples: Beware the Marriage Penalty,
CNNMONEY (June 27, 2013, 7:07 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/27/pf/same-sex
-marriage-penalty/index.html; Susanna Kim & Lauren Pearle, Many Same-Sex Couples May
Pay More in Taxes After Marriage, ABC NEWS (June 27, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com
/Business/sex-couples-pay-taxes-marriage/story?id=19505554&singlePage=true; Roberton
Williams, DOMA’s Demise Means Higher Taxes for Some Same-Sex Couples, FORBES (June
26,
2013,
2:27
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2013/06/26/domas
-demise-means-higher-tax-bills-for-some-same-sex-couples/.
31. See, e.g., Dan A. Black, Seth G. Sanders & Lowell J. Taylor, The Economics of
Lesbian and Gay Families, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 63 (2007).
32. See, e.g., Gregory Acs & Elaine Maag, Irreconcilable Differences? The Conflict
Between Marriage Promotion Initiatives for Cohabiting Couples with Children and
Marriage Penalties in Tax and Transfer Programs, in NEW FEDERALISM, at 2 (Urban Inst.,
Ser. No. B-66, 2005).
33. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 21, at 14.
34. As I discuss in a working paper, as applied to different-sex couples, marriage is an
imperfect proxy but probably not so under- or over-inclusive as to be unconstitutional. As
applied to same-sex couples, it may be. Widiss, supra note 12.
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taxes as individuals (or a joint return taxed at individual rates, which was usually
disadvantageous). This meant that couples living in community property states,
who were required to share both earned and investment income and thus fell within
lower tax brackets, generally paid far less federal income tax than comparable
couples in common law title states, who were not permitted to share or transfer
earned income. This result was considered profoundly unfair, and the joint return
for married couples, with a separate rate structure from individual returns, was put
in place to address this inequity.35
The potential injustice of federal rights for same-sex couples varying
dramatically based on the state in which they live was a persistent theme in the oral
argument in Windsor. It was pursued by Justices Alito and Scalia in their
questioning of Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr. and Edie Windsor’s attorney
Roberta Kaplan and emphasized by BLAG attorney Paul Clement in his arguments
in support of DOMA.36 In the Windsor opinion, however, the issue receded almost
into invisibility.37 The reasons for that change are not hard to surmise. In a world
with DOMA, the expectation that the federal government would treat same-sex
couples consistently was an argument for upholding the law. Paul Clement, and
Justices Scalia and Alito—both of whom ultimately dissented in Windsor—might
have believed that the argument could garner some sympathy from other justices
more inclined to strike DOMA down. In the post-DOMA world, however, the
argument immediately flips. Now, state-based variation in marriage rights calls for
a more general rethinking of the federal government’s reliance on state marriage
definitions as the sole mechanism for qualifying for important federal benefits and
obligations.

35. See, e.g., Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint
Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 653–55 (2010) (discussing this history); Julie A.D.
Manasfi, Joint Federal Income Tax Returns: If DOMA Dies and Even if It Lives the Weak
Case for Distinguishing Between Same-Sex and Different-Sex Married Couples 14–19 (Mar.
14, 2013) (unpublished paper), available at http://works.bepress.com/julie_manasfi/2/
(discussing this history and quoting a Senate Report stating that the joint return was intended
to “produce substantial geographical equalization”).
36. In addition to the quotation from Justice Alito, supra text accompanying note 1, see,
e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 87 (question of Justice Scalia to Solicitor
General Verrilli) (“So you think that’s bad as well, that all three of those [couples] have to be
treated the same, despite State law about marriage[?]”); id. at 100–02 (Justice Alito posing
questions to Roberta Kaplan regarding a potential equal protection claim brought by a samesex couple living in North Carolina denied a waiver of the estate tax); id. at 111–12 (BLAG
attorney Paul Clement) (“And we heard today that there’s a problem when somebody moves
from New York to North Carolina, they can lose their benefits. The Federal government . . .
can say, well, that doesn’t make any sense . . . . We don’t want somebody, if they are going
to be transferred in the military from West Point to Fort Sill in Oklahoma, to resist the
transfer because they are going to lose some benefits. It makes sense to have a uniform
Federal rule for the Federal government.”) (emphasis added).
37. The majority opinion does not touch on the issue at all. Justice Scalia’s dissent
highlights some of the choice-of-law questions that will arise if a couple moves from a
marriage-recognition state to a non-recognition state. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2708 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Windsor, however, fails to take up that
invitation, stating explicitly that “[t]his opinion and its holding are confined to”
only “those persons who are joined in same-sex marriages made lawful by the
State.”38 As a matter of legal doctrine, this limitation is reasonable, since that was
the question actually at issue in the case. And of course, the statement is a
calculated response to the charge, argued vociferously by Justice Scalia in dissent,
that Windsor effectively decided the larger question of whether state bans on samesex marriage were similarly unconstitutional.39 But in thus circumscribing the
holding, Windsor leaves unaddressed a deeper inequality. That is, Windsor speaks
stirringly of the significant tangible and intangible harms DOMA caused to samesex married couples who were unfairly denied federal rights ranging from “the
mundane to the profound.”40 The opinion fails to even acknowledge, however, that
so long as the federal government continues to simply rely on state marriage
classifications, existing bans on marriage in more than thirty states have similar
pernicious effects.
Of course, even if state bans were eliminated, not every same-sex couple would
marry. But when states do legalize marriage, an average of 30% of identified samesex couples marry within the first year alone.41 This suggests that a significant
number of same-sex couples living in non-recognition states would marry if they
could—and, more centrally, that a significant number of such couples make
personal and financial commitments to each other that are functionally
indistinguishable from those made by (different-sex and same-sex) married
couples.
II. LEVELING UP
Census data suggests that there are approximately 646,000 same-sex couples
living together in the United States.42 At the time Windsor was litigated,
approximately 114,000 of these same-sex couples were married, with about 76,000
living in a state that recognized their marriage and another 38,000 living in a state
that did not.43 In other words, when DOMA was held unconstitutional, only a small

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 2695, 2696 (majority decision).
Id. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2694 (majority opinion).
M.V. LEE BADGETT & JODY L. HERMAN, WILLIAMS INST., PATTERNS OF
RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION BY SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE UNITED STATES 11–12 (2011).
42. Brief of Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent Windsor at 15–16,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
43. See id. at 25–26 (estimating that there were 114,000 same-sex couples in the United
States who were married); Press Release, Williams Inst., Supreme Court Rulings Strike
Down DOMA and Prevent Enforcement of California’s Proposition 8 (June 26, 2013),
available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/press-releases/supreme-court-rulings
-26-jun-2013/ (estimating 76,000 married couples live in states that recognize the union and
38,000 live in states that do not); see also Drew DeSilver, How Many Same-Sex Marriages
in the U.S.? At Least 71,165, Probably More, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 26, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/26/how-many-same-sex-marriages-in-theu-s-at-least-71165-probably-more (documenting at least 71,165 same-sex marriages by
reviewing state marriage records, but noting the actual number was almost certainly far
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fraction—approximately one-eighth—of identified same-sex couples actually
received full federal marriage rights. That number has since grown considerably:
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode Island
have all legalized marriage by same-sex couples since Windsor was decided. But
even with these recent additions, more than half of the nation’s same-sex couples
live in non-recognition states.44 Federal policy should be changed so that couples,
whatever their state of residence, who are willing to make formal commitments to
each other comparable to those made by married couples can access the rights,
benefits, and obligations of marriage under federal law.
A. Three Tiers of Federal Marriage Rights
Now that section three of DOMA has been struck down, federal marriage policy
sorts same-sex couples into three tiers. Couples who are lawfully married and live
in states that recognize their marriages receive all of the federal benefits and
obligations of marriage. Couples who are lawfully married but live in states that do
not recognize their marriage receive some of the federal benefits and obligations of
marriage. Same-sex couples who are unmarried—including, most likely, those in
state-created civil unions or domestic partnerships—receive none of the federal
benefits and obligations of marriage.45
The key question for married couples living in non-recognition states is whether
the relevant statute, regulation, or agency policy indicates that marriages will be
higher since many states had not yet reported data from 2012 or 2013).
44. In October 2013, immediately after New Jersey legalized same-sex marriage, the
Williams Institute at UCLA estimated that 40% of the nation’s estimated 646,000 same-sex
couples were living in a state where they could marry. Press Release, Williams Inst., Almost
17,000 Same-Sex Couples Now Eligible for Marriage Benefits in New Jersey (Oct. 21,
2013), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/press/press-releases/almost-17000
-same-sex-couples-now-eligible-for-marriage-benefits-in-new-jersey/. The 40% number
pre-dated the addition of Hawaii and Illinois, but Illinois has been estimated to have
approximately 23,000 same-sex couples, Infographic: Illinois, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (Nov.
2013),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/headlines/infographic-extending-marriage-to
-same-sex-couples-in-il/, and Hawaii certainly has far fewer same-sex couples, Infographic:
Hawai’i, Williams Institute (Nov. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research
/census-lgbt-demographics-studies/infographic-hi-snapshot/, meaning that still fewer than
44% of same-sex couples live in a state with marriage equality. Additionally, Oregon
recently began recognizing out-of-state same-sex marriages, see supra note 6, but even with
this addition, well over 50% of same-sex couples live in non-recognition states, and thus are
categorically barred from some key federal rights premised on marriage.
45. Several federal agencies have indicated that individuals in civil unions or domestic
partnerships will not be considered “married” for federal purposes. Garden State Equal. v.
Dow, No. L-1729-11, 2013 WL 5397372, at *7–8 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.) (Sept. 27,
2013) (collecting agency statements on the matter). This is not surprising, since the relevant
federal statutes typically use words such as “marriage,” “spouse,” “wife,” or “husband.”
Citing this trend, a New Jersey lower court decision held that refusing to permit same-sex
couples to marry (rather than just form civil unions) violated the state constitution because it
deprived couples of significant federal rights. Id. at *24. In October 2013, Governor Chris
Christie decided not to appeal this ruling, and same-sex marriage became available statewide
in New Jersey. Kate Zernike and Marc Santora, As Gays Wed in New Jersey, Christie Yields,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, at A1.
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judged based on a place-of-celebration rule—that is, whether it was valid within the
jurisdiction where the couple married—or a domicile rule—that is, whether it is
valid within the jurisdiction where the couple resides. Until DOMA was held
unconstitutional, variation among federal standards on this issue was relatively
unimportant. States generally have fairly similar rules (other than those concerning
same-sex marriage) regarding who may get married, and, where there are
differences (again, other than those concerning same-sex marriage), most states will
recognize an out-of-state marriage as valid even if they would not have authorized
it directly.46 Therefore, for different-sex couples, application of a “place-ofcelebration” or a “domicile” rule will generally lead to the same result: a couple
who has lawfully married in one state is considered married wherever they reside
for both federal and state purposes. For same-sex couples, that is certainly not the
case.
Thus, the domicile or place-of-celebration question must be answered for each
of the 1000-plus distinct federal statutory provisions that address marriage.
Relevant agencies have announced that tax, immigration, military and civilian
federal employee benefits, and private benefits governed by ERISA will follow a
place-of-celebration rule.47 (Some of these legal interpretations, however, may be
challenged.)48 Social Security, by contrast, will follow a domicile rule, and most
likely so will veterans’ benefits and the federally-protected right of many
nonfederal employees to take time off from work to care for a spouse with a serious

46. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of NonUniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 435, 442–44 (2005). Most states recognize a
“public policy” exception to this general rule but, at least since the Supreme Court held that
anti-miscegenation laws were unconstitutional, it has been little invoked in any context other
than same-sex marriage. See id.; see also Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and
Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105 (1996).
47. See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION LETTER NO. 13-203,
COVERAGE OF SAME-SEX SPOUSES (2013) (discussing federal employee benefits); Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD Announces Same-Sex Spouse Benefits (Aug. 14, 2013),
available at http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=16203 (discussing
military benefits); Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, All Legal Same-Sex
Marriages Will Be Recognized for Federal Tax Purposes, (Aug. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2153.aspx (discussing tax); U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, Technical Release No. 2013-04, Guidance to Employee Benefit Plans on the
Definition of “Spouse” and “marriage” under ERISA and the Supreme Court’s Decision in
United States v. Windsor (Sept. 18, 2013) (discussing ERISA); Implementation of the
Supreme Court Ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/topic/implementation-supreme-court-ruling-defense-marriage-act
(discussing immigration rights).
48. See, e.g., Alberto R. Gonzales & David N. Strange, Op-Ed., What the Court Didn’t
Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2013, at A23 (arguing that same-sex married couples are still not
eligible for spousal rights under immigration law); see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr., 3 States
End Resistance to Spousal Benefits Order, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2013, at A24 (reporting that
nine states initially refused to process benefits paperwork for same-sex of National Guard
members on the grounds that doing so would violate state law, but that as of late-November
2013 only three states continued their opposition to the new rule).
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medical condition.49 For many other policies, it is still unclear which approach will
be adopted. Federal agencies are presumably working to provide additional
guidance as soon as possible. Nonetheless, without a comprehensive statutory fix,
there will be confusion and uncertainty for individuals, regulators, and courts for
months and years to come—and some significant federal benefits will remain
categorically unavailable to same-sex couples who live in states that refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages.
B. A Place-of-Celebration Rule—And Its Significant Weaknesses
The most frequently discussed solution to the “new” marriage discrimination—
that is, the uneven treatment of same-sex couples based on their state of
residence—is that the federal government should pass legislation adopting a
uniform place-of-celebration rule that would apply to all federal rights and
obligations of marriage. This approach has been proposed in Congress50 and
endorsed by leading advocacy groups,51 prominent news organizations,52 and

49. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.113 (2013) (“Spouse [for purposes of the Family and Medical
Leave Act] means a husband or wife as defined or recognized under State law for purposes
of marriage in the State where the employee resides.”); Program Operations Manual
System—GN 00210 BASIC: Windsor Same-Sex Marriage Claims, SSA.GOV (Aug. 9, 2013),
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/public/reference.nsf/links/08092013111040AM (providing that
spousal claims will be permitted when claimant “was married in a state that permits samesex marriage” and “is domiciled at the time of the application, or while the claim is pending
a final determination, in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage”); Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces Move to Extend Veterans Benefits to SameSex Married Couples (Sept. 4, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa
/pr/2013/September/13-ag-991.html. Further analysis may be found in a detailed set of fact
sheets developed by a group of advocacy organizations, discussing the likely applicability of
various federal statutes to couples who are married but live in states that do not recognize the
marriage and providing updates as agencies have provided more definitive guidance. These
are available on the coalition’s members’ websites. See After DOMA: What It Means for You
[hereinafter After DOMA Fact Sheets], HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (July 9, 2013),
http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/what-do-the-doma-decisions-mean-for-you/ (fact sheet for
“Veteran’s Spousal Benefits”) (discussing likelihood that place of domicile rule will apply).
50. Respect for Marriage Act, H.R. 2523, 113th Cong. (2013) (as of July 25, 2013, 165
cosponsors); S. 1236, 113th Cong. (2013) (as of July 26, 2013, 42 cosponsors). As
introduced, this bill would both establish a uniform place-of-celebration rule and repeal
Section 2 of DOMA, which provides that states need not recognize other states’ same-sex
marriages. See id. If the bill passed with both provisions intact, and if states did in fact begin
to recognize out-of-state marriages, my concerns below regarding divorce would be
mitigated. But both of those “ifs” are far from certain, since many state constitutions
preclude such recognition and any change to that policy would probably be far more
controversial than adopting a place-of-celebration rule for federal purposes. Moreover, even
if other states did recognize the marriages, the up-front burdens, in terms of travel costs and
dignitary injury, would remain a problem with a place-of-celebration rule.
51. The coalition of the leading LGBT advocacy groups characterizes “the movement’s
next steps on DOMA” as a “commit[ment] to working until every single legally married
same-sex couple receives the same protections, responsibilities, and programs as all other
married couples—regardless of where they live—and to securing the freedom to marry
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President Obama.53 Even without statutory reform, advocates and the
administration have aggressively pushed individual agencies to adopt a place-ofcelebration approach in any context in which it is viable under existing statutory
language. This has been successful, and many key federal marriage rights are now
available to same-sex married couples even if they live in states with marriage
bans.54
I applaud this development. It obviously mitigates the substantive unfairness
discussed above by making it at least theoretically possible for same-sex couples to
receive the federal rights and benefits of marriage wherever they live. The place-ofcelebration approach has some other clear strengths. It is easy to apply and retains
the familiar assumption that marriage is a gateway to benefits. It also allows the
federal government to continue to piggyback on state procedures for licensing,
recording, and dissolving marriages (though with some significant problems when
it comes to divorce, as discussed below). And, for many areas of federal law, it
does not require congressional action.
But the place-of-celebration approach has some very significant weaknesses that
have been little discussed.
First, for some same-sex couples, requiring travel to a state where they can
marry puts federal benefits literally out of reach. For example, a couple who lives
in southern Florida would currently need to travel about 1000 miles to reach
Maryland, the closest state with marriage equality. Although the military
recognizes this problem and offers service members extra time off,55 most private
employers will not do so. Nor will they pay the costs of such a trip. Already,
marriage rates are highly skewed by educational achievement, class, and race.56 A
place-of-celebration rule magnifies such disparities for same-sex couples.
nationwide.” After DOMA Fact Sheets, supra note 49 (fact sheet for “General” at 2). If the
movement were actually successful in both these goals (that is, a uniform place-ofcelebration rule and securing the freedom to marry nationwide), the derivative
discrimination problem would be eliminated. But again, at this point, the first goal is more
politically viable than the second, and as discussed in the text, it has some significant
weaknesses.
52. See, e.g., Editorial, Equal Marriages—and Now Equal Benefits, WASH. POST (July
21, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-21/opinions/40713630_1_federal
-benefits-federal-government-nationalized-gay-marriage; Editorial, How Obama Can Make
Same-Sex Marriage Meaningful, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2013, 6:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-27/how-obama-can-make-same-sex-marriage
-meaningful.html (both endorsing a place-of-celebration rule).
53. See Colleen McCain Nelson, Obama Hails DOMA Ruling, Sees Work Ahead, WALL
ST. J. WASH. WIRE (June 27, 2013, 8:33 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/06/27
/obama-hails-doma-ruling-sees-work-ahead/ (quoting President Obama as stating his
“personal belief . . . that if you’ve been married in Massachusetts and you move somewhere
else, you’re still married and that, under federal law, you should be able to obtain benefits
like any lawfully married couple”).
54. See supra text accompanying note 47.
55. See U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 47.
56. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW
FAMILIES 22–23, 28–29 (2010), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11
/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf; Andrew J. Cherlin, Demographic Trends in the United
States: A Review of Research in the 2000s, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 403, 404–05 (2010).
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Even for couples with the financial means to travel, there may be a significant
dignitary harm. Windsor speaks in stirring tones of the importance of marriage as a
means for couples to “affirm their commitment to one another before their children,
their family, their friends, and their community.”57 Absent a holding that state
marriage bans violate the Federal Constitution, the federal government cannot
require states to allow same-sex couples to marry under state law in their own
community. But same-sex couples in one part of the United States should not be
forced to marry in a different part of the United States, which for many will
necessarily be far from family and friends, simply to claim federal rights.
And for some couples, the most serious problem with marrying out-of-state to
obtain federal benefits will come later, if they ultimately decide they would like to
dissolve their relationship. States will generally permit nonresident couples to
marry, but they usually will not permit nonresident couples to divorce. Same-sex
married couples who live in non-recognition states have already found (often to
their shock and horror) that their home state will not grant them a divorce, and, in
many instances, neither will the state that married them.58 In the best
circumstances, this imposes considerable additional legal cost and complexity by
requiring the couple to litigate a divorce in a jurisdiction where neither of them
lives. In the worst cases, a couple is actually trapped in a marriage, for both state
and federal purposes, that one or both would like to end but unable to obtain a
divorce.59
Divorce for same-sex couples living in non-recognition states was already a
problem before Windsor. The demise of DOMA and the greater incentives that now
exist for couples to go out-of-state to marry will make it worse. Adoption of a
uniform place-of-celebration rule would raise the stakes even higher. So long as
state marriage bans remain in place, federal policy should not require same-sex
couples to run the risk of being literally “wedlocked”60 simply because they seek to
access federal benefits.

57. Windsor v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013).
58. This problem has been partially addressed for some couples: some states that permit
same-sex marriage now permit same-sex couples who cannot divorce in their home state to
seek a divorce in the state that married them. See NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, DIVORCE
FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES WHO LIVE IN NON-RECOGNITION STATES: A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS
(2013),
available
at
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/Divorce_in_DOMA
_States_Attorney_Guide.pdf. Other couples, however, continue to be trapped. See, e.g.,
Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, Wedlocked, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2012);
Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and Minimum
Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011) (both discussing these issues in detail).
59. For a discussion specifically of the federal tax consequences of the inability to
divorce, see Anthony Infanti, Why Gay Couples Hate the IRS, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2013,
9:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-06/why-gay-couples-hate-the-irs
-more-than-you-do.html. For a more general discussion of state and federal law
consequences, see generally Byrn & Holcomb, supra note 58; Joslin, supra note 58.
60. I borrow this term from Mary Patricia Byrn and Morgan L. Holcomb. See Byrn &
Holcomb, supra note 58.
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C. A Federal Domestic Partner—or Marriage?—Registry
It would be better for the federal government to develop its own mechanism for
identifying committed couples who should be entitled to what are now considered
federal marital benefits. This could be in addition to, or in place of, place-ofcelebration rules.61 That is, the federal government should respond to the problem
of dramatically different state rules regarding who may marry by creating a registry
that would permit (at least) same-sex couples to receive the federal rights and
benefits of marriage regardless of their state of residence.
Prior to DOMA being struck down, the military was developing a domestic
partner registry that would have made many benefits that otherwise flow solely
from marriage available to service members in same-sex relationships;62 the
military has since (unfortunately I believe) abandoned this project and replaced it
with a place-of-celebration rule.63 Likewise, also prior to Windsor, the Federal
Office of Personnel Management advocated providing spousal benefits to same-sex
partners of federal employees.64 The registry I suggest would go further than these
proposals by providing, like state civil union and domestic partner analogues, the
full panoply of federal marriage rights, or, as discussed in Part III, serving as a
vehicle for better tailoring such rights for both same-sex and different-sex couples.
Such a registry would address the core inequality left in DOMA’s wake without
imposing front-end travel costs or back-end divorce challenges on same-sex
couples. It would not, however, implicate rights and obligations—such as those
concerning property distribution, spousal support, or custody—under state
marriage law.65

61. If the registry were developed in the absence of a uniform place-of-celebration rule,
it should be structured in such a way as to include married couples living in non-recognition
states, ideally through definitional provisions that would automatically include such
marriages.
62. See Karen Parrish, Same-Sex Couples Can Claim New Benefits by October, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF. (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID
=119260.
63. See Memorandum from Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of Military Dep’ts
(Aug. 13, 2013) available at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2013/docs/Extending
-Benefits-to-Same-Sex-Spouses-of-Military-Members.pdf (stating that “the extension of
benefits to the same-sex domestic partners of military members is no longer necessary to
remedy the inequity that was caused by section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act”); U.S.
Dep’t of Def., supra note 47.
64. The OPM proposal included different-sex partners as well. See Eric Katz, OPM
Proposes Extending Fed Health Benefits to Same Sex Partners, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Apr. 11,
2013),
http://www.govexec.com/pay-benefits/2013/04/opm-proposes-extending-federal
-health-benefits-same-sex-partners/62439/. Bills have been introduced that would make the
same policy change. See Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act, H.R. 3485,
112th Cong. (2011); S. 1910, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 2517, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1102,
111th Cong. (2009) (would provide “marriage”-based employment benefits and obligations
to federal employees in domestic partnerships); see also Social Security Equality Act, H.R.
3050, 113th Cong. (2013) (would provide Social Security “spousal” benefits to same-sex
couples in state-recognized legal statuses such as domestic partnerships or civil unions).
65. There are areas of federal law, including pension benefits and bankruptcy, where
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State, local, and private employer domestic partner and civil union registries
could provide a template for a federal registry.66 Most such registries require
couples to affirm that the couple meets the jurisdiction’s requirements for marriage,
other than being different-sex, and that they are in—and intend to remain in—a
long-term committed relationship. Often, couples must affirm that they live
together and/or have integrated financial responsibilities,67 standards that are not
explicitly required for individuals who choose to marry68 but which articulate the
assumptions regarding marriage that are embedded in federal law.69 Generally, they
provide that partnerships may be ended simply upon notice to the relevant entity
and the other person, although, as discussed below, more formal dissolution
procedures might be required for a federal registry.
If the federal government were to create a federal registry, it would face some
different questions than those addressed by state, local, or private registries. A
threshold question is whether such a registry would be constitutional. The short
answer, I believe, is probably “yes.” In the Windsor litigation, some claimed that
DOMA exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers, since states historically have had
primary responsibility for licensing marriages.70 Windsor, while recognizing this
history, explicitly declined to base its holding on these federalism arguments.71 And
for good reason. Although the Supreme Court has sometimes characterized
marriage as primarily a matter of state law, federal policy has long been integrally
federal marriage law intertwines with state marriage law and where careful thought would be
required to determine how best to achieve the underlying objective of providing same-sex
couples equal access to federal marital benefits without intruding unreasonably into what is
properly considered state divorce law. See infra note 84 (discussing issues related to pension
benefits in more detail).
66. The Human Rights Campaign maintains a list with links to dozens of different
domestic partner registries. City and County Domestic Partner Registries, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/city-and-county-domestic-partner-registries.
67. For example, the Dayton, OH registry requires partners to affirm that they “share a
common residence” and “have a committed relationship and share responsibility for each
other’s common welfare.” Domestic Partner Registry, CITY OF DAYTON,
http://www.daytonohio.gov/cco/Pages/Registry.aspx.
68. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1772–73 (2005)
(noting that marriage “in many respects licenses greater flexibility and less state intrusion
into family life” than domestic partnership requirements and critiquing domestic partnerships
on those grounds); see also Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of
Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2286320
(showing how domestic partnerships were modeled on marriage, although ultimately they
also helped redefine marriage).
69. To the extent that a registry that required such affirmations could provide a better
proxy for achieving the objectives of certain federal policies, it theoretically could be used in
place of “marriage” for both different-sex and same-sex couples. See infra Part III.
70. These arguments were advanced most fully in an amicus brief submitted to the
Court by several prominent federalism scholars. See Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)
(No. 12-307), 2013 WL 860459.
71. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (“[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether this federal
intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal
balance.”).
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involved in family matters.72 It seems clear that the federal government has power
to define familial relationships for the purposes of developing and administering
federal law.73 Notably, during oral argument in Windsor, the parties and several
justices suggested that the federal government could extend the benefits to samesex couples through a registry along the lines I propose.74
A second, I think harder, question is whether such a registry would be available
only to same-sex couples and perhaps even only to same-sex couples who live in
states in which they cannot marry. If the primary impetus behind the registry is
simply to respond to the current inequities caused by the variation in state marriage
rights for same-sex couples, it might be reasonable to limit its availability. On the
other hand, there are some strong arguments for making such a status more
generally available.75 In several other countries and in some U.S. states, domestic
partnerships or civil unions are available as an alternative to marriage for both
different-sex and same-sex couples; in France they have become almost as common
as marriages (likely in part a reflection of the relative ease with which they may be
dissolved compared to marriages).76 Colorado, Hawaii, and Vermont have created

72. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1297 (1998).
73. See generally Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism, and Family Equality, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156 (2013) (discussing and critiquing federalism arguments in
Windsor).
74. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 81 (question of Chief Justice
Roberts to Solicitor General Verrilli) (Q: “[Y]ou agree that Congress could go the other way,
right? Congress could pass a new law today that says . . . . [w]hen we say ‘marriage’ in
Federal law, we mean same—committed same-sex couples as well, and that could apply
across the board?” . . . A: “I don’t think it would raise a federalism problem.”); id. at 96–99
(similar questions by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito to Roberta Kaplan,
counsel for Edith Windsor, in which Kaplan likewise opined that Congress could do so at
least if the status were called something other than marriage); cf. id. at 76 (answer by Paul
Clement, BLAG attorney to a question by Justice Kennedy concerning arguments that
DOMA violated federalism principles) (“I think there is so clearly is [sic] a Federal power
because DOMA doesn’t define any term that appears anywhere other than in a Federal
statute that we assume there is Federal power for.”).
75. See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE 146–207
(2008) [hereinafter POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE] (arguing for
reconsidering the use of marriage as a prerequisite for receipt of many government benefits,
rights, and obligations); Elizabeth M. Glazer, Civil Union Equality, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV.
DE NOVO 125, 133–36, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/Joomla1.5/content/denovo
/Glazer.DOMA.2012.Final.PDF (discussing personal or religious reasons why different-sex
couples stated they preferred to form a domestic partnership under Illinois law than to
marry); Nancy D. Polikoff, “Two Parts of the Landscape of Family in America”:
Maintaining Both Spousal and Domestic Partner Employee Benefits for Both Same-Sex and
Different-Sex Couples, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 735 (2012) (arguing that domestic partner
benefits should be available for both different-sex and same-sex couples).
76. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1881, 1943–44 (2012)
(cataloging available statuses by state); Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding Marriage Tunnel
Vision, 88 TULANE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), draft available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247552, at 50 (discussing ease of
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“reciprocal” or “designated” beneficiary statuses that provide some “marital” rights
to close family members, such as siblings or parents and children, who cannot
marry, or, in Colorado’s case, to any pair of unmarried adults, whether or not they
are related or in a romantic relationship.77 And, even more surprising to American
sensibilities, in many other countries, cohabiting couples without any formal status
receive many of the same rights as married couples.78 Creating a federal registry
could invite more general reconsideration of the singular reliance on marriage
under U.S. federal law. As discussed in Part III, particularly if a future Supreme
Court decision grants same-sex couples the right to marry anywhere, a federal
domestic partner registry could be a vehicle to better tailor federal policies for all
families, so long as it was structured to treat comparable same-sex and different-sex
couples equally.
A related question would be what the registry should be called. As the fight over
same-sex marriage has made clear, the word “marriage” carries immense symbolic
weight. Some state supreme courts have held that it is so significant that calling
same-sex unions anything else violates core principles of equality.79 If same-sex
couples, wherever they live, could “marry” federally, they would gain access not
only to the rights, benefits, and obligations of marriage under federal law but also
to the respect for marital relationships that undergirds those federal policies. That
said, calling the status marriage would undoubtedly be more controversial
politically and it would seem to more squarely implicate federalism concerns. It
also would signal strongly that federal policy remains focused exclusively on
“marital” status. For both these reasons, I would suggest that, in this context, the
word might not be worth the fight, although I recognize that there are compelling
arguments on the other side.
Additional technical issues would need to be resolved. Would there be a single
federal standard for other aspects of marriage eligibility (e.g., minimum age rules
or consanguinity) or would the federal registry simply follow the rules of the

ending a French civil union); Scott Sayare & Maia de la Baume, Bliss for Many French
Couples Is Now Less Marital Than Civil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010, at A1 (reporting civil
unions could soon outnumber marriages in France, and that they are also available in several
other countries).
77. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-22-101, et seq. (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C4 (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1301. For a detailed description of these state laws, and
how they relate to legal statuses for same-sex and different-sex couples, see Feinberg, supra
note 76, at 6–16.
78. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, supra note 75, at 110–22. In
the United States, most governmental benefits premised on marriage are not available to
cohabiting couples who lack legal status, but courts may hold that one member of the couple
owes support to the other under contract or equitable theories. See Eskridge, supra note 76,
at 1929–35.
79. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 480 (Conn. 2008);
Ops. of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 2004) (both concluding
separate status was impermissible). But see, e.g., Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J.
2006) (concluding separate status was permissible). A more recent New Jersey case held that
now that the different state terminology deprives couples of federal rights, the state was
required to permit same-sex couples to marry. Garden State Equal. v. Dow, No. L-1729-11,
2013 WL 5397372, at *24 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 27, 2013).
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couple’s domicile state?80 Or, as suggested above, would eligibility be extended
beyond couples with a romantic affiliation? Would it create any kind of “parental”
relationship with a partner’s children for purposes of federal law, even in the
absence of a recognized parental relationship under state law?81 And how would
dissolution be handled? This last question is somewhat less difficult than it might
appear at first blush. The primary objective of much of state marriage and divorce
law is the regulation of a couple’s obligations to each other, and property
distribution, spousal support, and custody laws typically call for a subjective
assessment of multiple factors as applied to a particular couple.82 Federal
“marriage” law, by contrast, generally regulates the relationship of the government
or private entities to the marital unit. Moreover, as discussed above (albeit
critiqued below), federal law generally uses marriage as an all-or-nothing proxy for
commitment and interdependence, rather than requiring a specific inquiry into the
nature of the relationship between the members of the couple.83 Thus, the kind of
detailed fact-finding—and contentiousness—that typifies state divorce proceedings
would be far less necessary in the context of dissolving a relationship that simply
affects federal marriage rights.84 Nonetheless, it certainly would be important to

80. Existing proposals for federal registries, see supra text accompanying notes 62 &
64, suggest incorporating the couple’s domicile’s rules on such matters. However,
sometimes it may be difficult to determine whether a couple has a single domicile and, if so,
what it is. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender, 47
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
81. My thanks to Courtney Joslin for flagging this issue for me. See also Courtney G.
Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and Federal Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (2013) (providing
detailed discussion of Social Security and military benefits that flow to children through, in
part, recognition of marital relationships).
82. But several states have simplified divorce procedures that are available to couples
with limited assets and no children. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2400 (West 2004); MINN.
STAT. 518.195 (2012).
83. There are some federal policies that require a showing of marriage “plus” other
factors to further confirm that the marriage is legitimate. See Abrams, supra note 17, at 15–
22.
84. Although in most instances federal “marriage” law doesn’t directly affect
distribution of marital property, pension plans are a partial exception. A federal law, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), requires most pension plans to provide
survivor annuities to the spouse of an employee in the plan, unless the spouse and the
employee both sign a waiver. See 26 U.S.C. § 417 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006). This
rule would presumably apply to same-sex relationships in the federal registry. A separate
provision of ERISA permits state courts to award part or all of an employee’s retirement
plan to a spouse or former spouse, which generally occurs as part of the division of marital
property in a divorce. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2006). The standard rule is that
such orders must be made by a state court under state domestic relations law, see id., which
would likely be unavailable to same-sex couples living in non-recognition states (unless their
divorce is being handled by a different state, see supra note 58). This suggests two possible
resolutions. The first would be to amend ERISA to state that a federal forum with authority
to dissolve the federal relationship would also be empowered to divide or assign pension
benefits (but not other property, which would remain a matter of state law). The second
would be to simply accept that division of such pension plans remains exclusively a matter
of state divorce law and accordingly unavailable to many same-sex couples. As a practical
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have a clear process by which this federal status could be terminated and an
administrative or judicial forum in which any disputes could be resolved.85
Although a full discussion of these implementation questions is outside the
scope of this essay, the success of state and local programs suggests that it would
not be unduly difficult to create and maintain such a registry. That said, there is no
question that it would be somewhat more challenging to establish a new system
than simply adopting agency-specific place-of-celebration rules, or even enacting a
uniform place-of-celebration rule. On balance, I believe these logistical hurdles are
preferable to the deep-rooted problems implicit in relying on place-of-celebration
rules to “level up” federal policy. Additionally, under either approach, many samesex couples would be considered married for purposes of federal laws and
unmarried for purposes of state law. For example, now that the IRS has adopted a
place-of-celebration rule, married couples living in non-recognition states generally
need to prepare and file two completely different tax returns: a federal return as a
married couple, and two separate state returns as unmarried individuals. So long as
state variation in marriage rights remains, such inconsistent statuses—the inversion
of those that existed under DOMA—are the price of equality at the federal level.
D. Ending State Marriage Bans
The cleanest way to “level up” federal marriage policy for same-sex couples
would be to permit same-sex couples, wherever they live, to marry under state law.
In the months since Windsor was decided, many states have legalized same-sex
marriage; additional litigation and legislative efforts are underway to further
expand the number of states with marriage equality.86 And, although in
Hollingsworth v. Perry,87 the Supreme Court declined to reach the plaintiffs’
substantive claim that bans on marriage by same-sex couples violate the Federal
Constitution, sooner or later, the Supreme Court will return to the question. It is
widely believed that in that future case, the Court will hold that such laws are
unconstitutional. This would not only address the current inequities in state law—it
would end the derivative federal discrimination as well.

matter, it would mean that an individual who had named a same-sex partner as a beneficiary
for a retirement plan could simply remove the partner subsequent to the dissolution. There
are pros and cons to each approach that would require careful consideration if such a registry
were developed—and, indeed, require careful consideration under existing law because the
Department of Labor has indicated that generally ERISA will employ a place-of-celebration
rule in determining valid marriages. See supra note 47.
85. Since this federal status would implicate a couple’s status only under federal law
and concern only federal rights and obligations, federal courts or agencies presumably would
have jurisdiction to dissolve it. Cf. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992)
(stating that the “domestic relations exception [to federal jurisdiction] encompasses only
cases involving the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree”).
86. See, e.g., Gonzales, supra note 6; James Esseks, Expanding the Freedom to Marry:
Here’s What’s Next, ACLU (July 9, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/expandingfreedom-marry-heres-whats-next (announcing the ACLU’s goal of increasing the number of
states permitting same-sex marriage to twenty by the end of 2016).
87. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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III. BROADENING OUT AND FOCUSING IN
I would enthusiastically celebrate a Supreme Court decision that granted samesex couples the right to marry in any state. I believe that same-sex and different-sex
couples should enjoy equal rights under both federal and state law. But the current
debate over place-of-celebration rules versus domicile rules, like DOMA and the
Windsor case that led up to it, shines a spotlight on the staggering breadth and
variety of federal policies that reference marriage. And I admit that I am troubled
by the fact that any solution that effectively “levels up” the rights of same-sex
couples will almost certainly reduce the pressure for rethinking whether “marriage”
itself should continue to serve as the exclusive or primary gateway to more than
1000 federal rights and benefits. Already, in the wake of Windsor, the military has
abandoned efforts to create a domestic partner registry in favor of relying solely on
a uniform place-of-celebration rule.88 Similarly, several states that had created civil
unions or domestic partnerships as a means of providing marital rights to same-sex
couples abrogated this option when they began permitting same-sex couples to
marry,89 and states that had established domestic partnerships providing a subset of
marital rights and obligations eliminated the possibility of affirmatively choosing
such a status when they modified the status to provide full marital rights.90 In other
words, in many jurisdictions, such statuses came to be understood simply as
stepping stones to same-sex marriage, rather than as options that might be preferred
by some same-sex and different-sex couples.
This is unfortunate because the current mismatch between “marriage” and
“committed long-term interdependent relationships” for same-sex couples is only
the tip of a much larger iceberg. The growth in marriage rights for same-sex
couples comes at a time when family structures more generally are changing
significantly. In 1960, 72% of the adult population was married; in 2008, barely
half of the adult population was married, with rates falling particularly sharply for
the poor and African Americans.91 Unmarried couples with and without children
live together, as an alternative to marriage, a precursor to marriage, or in the
aftermath of divorce.92 And 40.8% of all children born in the United States are born

88. See supra note 63.
89. Feinberg, supra note 76, at 25.
90. Id. at 27. As Melissa Murray observes, there was a significant spike in domestic
partner dissolutions immediately prior to the effective date of California’s expansion of the
status to full marriage rights, suggesting that some couples preferred the more limited option
and did not want to commit to full marriage rights and obligations. Melissa Murray,
Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went from Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 302–03 (2013).
91. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 56, at i, 22–23, 28–29.
92. See, e.g., CASEY E. COPEN, KIMBERLY DANIELS & WILLIAM D. MOSHER, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH STATISTICS REPORTS NO. 64, FIRST
PREMARITAL COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2006–2010 (2013) (finding nearly
one-half of women cohabit prior to marriage); PAULA Y. GOODWIN, WILLIAM D. MOSHER &
ANJANI CHANDRA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS
SER. 23 NO. 28, MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL
PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6 (2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 11
(2010) (collecting data showing various sequences of cohabitation and marriage).
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to unmarried parents.93 Furthermore, the easy availability of no-fault divorce and
the growth of prenuptial agreements means that couples who do marry may not, in
fact, have formed the kind of long-term committed relationship with integrated
finances that federal law assumes.
As others have observed, the use of marriage as an all-or-nothing gateway for
federal (and state) benefits, rights, and obligations designed to support and protect
families is increasingly out-of-step with reality.94 Developing a federal domestic
partner registry could offer the opportunity for rethinking the justifications for
premising various federal rights and obligations solely on marital status for both
same-sex and different-sex couples. That is, if same-sex couples were permitted to
marry in all states, a domestic partner registry could play a valuable role not as a
marriage substitute, but instead as a marriage alternative.95 There are many ways
such a registry (or registries) could be structured. The key would be to identify the
underlying purpose of the federal policy at issue and then tailor the requirements
for inclusion in the registry appropriately.
In some instances, it might be appropriate to broaden-out marital benefits. For
example, the Family and Medical Leave Act permits eligible employees to take up
to twelve weeks off work to care for a family member with a serious health
condition, but limits eligible “family members” to the employee’s spouse, son,
daughter, or parent.96 This probably works well for many employees. But some
employees might wish to provide care for—or need to receive care from—a
romantic partner other than a spouse, a sibling, or a close friend. Perhaps, rather
than limiting such benefits to a “spouse,” it would be fairer and better policy to
simply permit all employees to designate one adult individual (beyond parents or
children) for whom she would provide care in the event of a serious health
condition.97

93. JOYCE A. MARTIN, BRADY E. HAMILTON, STEPHANIE J. VENTURA, MICHELLE J.K.
OSTERMAN, ELIZABETH C. WILSON & T.J. MATHEWS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORT VOL. 61 NO. 1, BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2010
(2012).
94. For proposals to retool at least aspects of federal marriage benefits to better match
the variety of family forms and other close relationships, see generally, e.g., MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES 226–36 (1995); POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE,
supra note 75, 123–214; Abrams, supra note 17, at 54–67; Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends
with Benefits, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 220–33 (2008); Robin West, The Incoherence of
Marital Benefits, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 179 (2012), http://www.pennlawreview
.com/online/161-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-179.pdf.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 76–78 (discussing jurisdictions that have
adopted marriage alternatives). For similar arguments endorsing a “menu” of options for
families, see, e.g., POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, supra note 75, at
132–45; Eskridge, supra note 76, at 1979–87; Feinberg, supra note 76, at 37–61; Murray,
supra note 90, at 303–05.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006).
97. In this context, there would be no reason why this would have to be a reciprocal
obligation. For an insightful discussion of the arguments for and viability of recognizing
“friendship” within family law more generally, see Rosenbury, supra note 94.
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For other federal policies it might be appropriate to focus-in. Social Security
permits a dependent spouse to claim spousal benefits, equal to 50% of the primary
breadwinner’s benefits; divorcees may likewise claim these benefits if the marriage
lasted at least ten years. These spousal benefits are not funded by any additional
contribution by the wage earner into the system; they are, as Peter Martin
characterizes it, “quite simply additional payments based on marriage,” subsidized
by the Social Security tax-paying base generally.98 Spousal benefits have the
greatest value to a spouse whose own earnings are considerably lower than her
spouse’s, and, although the program is now gender neutral, the vast majority of
recipients are women.99 As discussed above, a typical married couple with a sole
breadwinner will receive more than $500,000 in spousal benefits.100
There are various justifications for spousal benefits, including the presumptive
greater needs of married couples, relative to unmarried individuals, after retirement
of a primary wage earner; the role that domestic work by a nonbreadwinning
spouse may have played in the primary breadwinner’s earnings; or a desire to
support spouses who forego paid work to raise children.101 But spousal benefits are
available even if the spouse has ample other sources of support; to couples that
marry long after the breadwinner earned the bulk of his income; and to couples that
never had children.102 On the other hand, they are not available to single parents
who may likewise forego or reduce market work to care for children or to an
individual who divorces a breadwinning spouse at any point before ten years.
Rather than using marriage as a categorical on-off switch for benefits, Social
Security could be redesigned to replace marriage with more tailored measures that
respond to the core needs spousal benefits are intended to address.103
In this respect, it is helpful to return to the question posed by Justice Alito
during oral argument in Windsor that introduced this essay. The spirit of his
question was correct—that is, similarly-situated couples are now treated very
differently under federal law—but the specific factual predicate was flawed. The
injured soldier’s partner would almost certainly be allowed to visit the hospital
regardless of whether the couple was married, in a domestic partnership, or
unmarried. Historically, hospitals often barred visitors who were not related to a
patient by blood or marriage, and this was a significant problem for gay and lesbian

98. See Martin, supra note 21, at 1; see also Goodwin Liu, Social Security and the
Treatment of Marriage: Spousal Benefits, Earnings Sharing, and the Challenge of Reform,
1999 WIS. L. REV. 1 (discussing the history and rationales of spousal benefits and proposing
reforms).
99. See Martin, supra note 21, at 2.
100. See supra text accompanying note 24.
101. See id. at 4–7.
102. See, e.g., id.; Liu, supra note 98 (both making similar critiques).
103. In a rather ironic twist, several states that created domestic partnerships or civil
unions that were generally available only to same-sex couples also made them available to
different-sex couples over age 62. See Feinberg, supra note 76, at 15–16. This approach,
designed so that couples can access state-level benefits of marriage without ending eligibility
for federal Social Security spousal benefits stemming from a former spouse, is an implicit
recognition that many state-level marriage rights serve different purposes than federal Social
Security spousal benefits.
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couples. But since 2011, a federal rule has required virtually all hospitals to permit
patients to choose the individuals—including a spouse, domestic partner, family
members, and friends—who will receive visitation rights.104
Federal policymakers would do well to undergo this exercise more generally.
For some federal policies it likely makes sense to continue to require a showing of
marriage or comparable commitment. For others, marriage or comparable status
might be a good default rule, but made subject to modification. And for others, it
might be reasonable to permit, as hospitals now do, individuals to simply designate
family or friends whom they would like to receive a given benefit. A more tailored
approach would allow the federal government to better and more fairly meet the
needs of real individuals—gay and straight, married and unmarried—rather than
those of an idealized and imaginary “typical” American family.

104. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(h)(1)–(4) (2012); Brian Bond, New Rules Require Equal
Visitation Rights for All Patients, WHITE H OUSE B LOG (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/11/17/new-rules-require-equal-visitation-rights-all-patients.
There is a comparable policy specifically for the military. See Memorandum from Chuck
Hagel, Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts (Feb. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/Same-SexBenefitsMemo.pdf.

